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Abstract
We utilise a unique matched teacher-school data set of absenteeism
records to quantify shirking behaviour in primary and secondary schools.
Shirking behaviour is shown to vary systematically across schools, and
hence schools are characterised as either healthy (low absenteeism) or
￿The authors would like to thank Education Queensland for access to their data. The
opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
views of Education Queensland. The authors would also like to thank Geraint Johnes and
Rob Simmons for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1sick (high absenteeism). Using count data techniques, and allowing for
the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and partial observability in our
data, we ￿nd that teachers in sick schools have higher absence rates. Our
estimates suggest that shirking behaviour can account for 24% to 38% of
recorded absenteeism. Furthermore, a teacher who moves from a healthy
school to a sick school is likely to face an increased risk of absenteeism of
up to 70%. As the factors a⁄ecting involuntary absenteeism are unlikely
to change in the short run, we argue that this increased incidence in
absenteeism re￿ ects the impact of the change in school environment on
shirking behaviour.
1 Introduction
Absenteeism is viewed as costly and disruptive for organisations. For instance,
Barmby, Ercolani and Treble (2002) demonstrate for nine industrialised coun-
tries that a signi￿cant proportion of work hours are lost through absence; rang-
ing from 1.8% to 4% of average weekly hours. In the case of teachers, Table
1 shows that in Australia and the UK, three per cent of work time is lost
due to absenteeism. Teacher absence incurs direct costs through the organisa-
tion and payment of cover for absent teachers. In addition, there are indirect
costs in terms of adverse e⁄ects on other sta⁄ and possibly student perfor-
mance (Ehrenberg et al 1986). In contrast, psychologists have suggested that
absenteeism in stressful situations might be implicitly condoned by manage-
ment because it is seen as a form of temporary relief for the employee, and
2could therefore be regarded as an e¢ cient response (Steers and Rhodes 1978).
Devising an appropriate policy response to absenteeism is therefore complex,
even more so when it is realised that worker absence can occur involuntarily be-
cause of physical or mental ill-health, or because of voluntary shirking behaviour
by workers (Barmby, Ercolani and Treble 2002, Johansson and Palme 2002). A
recent report by the Western Australian Government conjectures that up to
50% of absence amongst public sector workers, including teachers, is in fact vol-
untary, which implies a substantial degree of shirking (Auditor General 1997).
1 Unfortunately, disentangling shirking behaviour (i.e. voluntary absence) from
involuntary absence is extremely di¢ cult to do in practice. Previous research has
attempted to do so using absence spell length, however, as Driver and Watson
(1989) argue this is unreliable because long spells of absence could be voluntary
and a sequence of short spells could be indicative of recurring sickness.
This paper takes a completely di⁄erent approach to tackling this issue. We
extend the standard theoretical model of absenteeism by distinguishing between
￿ sick￿and ￿ healthy￿schools, and hypothesise that shirking behaviour is more
common in ￿ sick￿schools. The incidence of shirking is expected to be higher in
schools with higher absence rates, an e⁄ect which arises because of organisa-
tional and peer e⁄ects. We test this hypothesis using a unique and previously
unused database of matched teachers and schools obtained from the Queens-
land government. Using this data we estimate econometric models of worker
absence, or more speci￿cally semi-parametric count data models, which enable
1Imants and van Zoelen (1995) suggested that only 20% of teacher absence could be directly
related to what they described as justi￿able medical grounds.
3us to control for the partial observability of absenteeism and unobserved worker
heterogeneity. Our results suggest that shirking behaviour can account for 24%
to 38% of recorded absenteeism. Furthermore, a teacher who moves from a
healthy school to a sick school is likely to face an increased risk of absenteeism
of up to 70%. As the factors in￿ uencing involuntary absenteeism are unlikely
to change markedly over a short period for the majority of individuals we ar-
gue that the increased incidence re￿ ects the impact of the change in school
environment on individual shirking behaviour.
The rest of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 contains a review
of relevant literature. In section 3 we provide a theoretical framework and
econometric methodology for the empirical work. Section 4 provides a detailed
description of the data that used in the empirical analysis, which is followed by
a discussion of the results in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
The theoretical and empirical literature on worker absenteeism has focused al-
most entirely on the private sector and very few studies have tried to disentangle
shirking from involuntary absence (Brown and Sessions 1996). Consequently,
many studies focus on the causes of absenteeism in general.
In the education literature, there have been many qualitative case studies of
the factors in￿ uencing teacher absenteeism (Eisenberg et al 1986, Dworkin et
al 1990, Imants and van Zoelen 1995) but little statistical analysis. Imants and
4van Zoelen (1995) argued that it was worthwhile classifying schools in terms
of those that are healthy and those that are sick. In other words, organisa-
tional factors seemed to play a signi￿cant role in determining rates of absence.
Speci￿cally, they found that collegial sta⁄ relationships and a supportive man-
agement style from the school principal were negatively associated with the rate
of teacher absence. The impact on absenteeism reduction of a head teachers￿re-
lationship with sta⁄ has also been noted in earlier case study evidence from the
US (Eisenberg et al 1986, Dworkin et al 1990). In the UK it has been concluded
that ￿motivation and commitment appear to be important elements which re-
strict absence through sickness￿and this suggested a need for absent manage-
ment programmes ￿that take account of the importance of schools￿leaders in
promoting healthy work environments￿(Department of Education, Science and
Training 2001).
The only previous econometric analysis of teacher absenteeism is Ehren-
berg et al (1986), who focused on providing an explanation of the di⁄erences
in average rates of teacher absenteeism between school districts because of dif-
ferences in sick pay provisions. Average absenteeism was positively associated
with the use of sick banks, whereby teachers could accumulate unused sick leave,
and negatively related to buy-back provisions that allowed unused leave to be
cashed in. More usage of sick leave occurred when the proportion of teachers
who were tenured increased. There was also some evidence to suggest that a
larger fraction of teachers aged over 55 reduced sick leave usage. Of the vari-
ables controlling for school environment, the proportion of students living in an
5urban area and the ethnic composition were insigni￿cant but the average level
of student absenteeism was positively correlated with teacher absenteeism.
Most of the previous research on absenteeism conducted by economists has
focused on the private sector and investigated the impact of both individ-
ual (supply side) and workplace (demand side) characteristics (Delgado and
Kniesner 1997, Barmby and Stephan 2000). Demand side factors that have
been discussed in the literature include ￿rm size (Coles and Treble 1996). It
is shown that larger ￿rms have higher rates of absenteeism, which arises be-
cause of their ability to diversify the risk from absence more easily (Barmby
and Stephan 2000). Clearly, the same could apply in a school environment.
Supply-side factors such as age and gender have been investigated using aggre-
gate data by Paringer (1983) and Bridges and Mumford (2001). Both studies
found that older and single workers were more likely to be absent, especially
for men. However, Delgado and Kniesner (1997) found the opposite e⁄ects in a
microeconomic study of London bus drivers.
3 Theoretical framework and econometric method-
ology
We base our model of absenteeism on the extended standard neo-classical utility
function suggested by Barmby, Sessions and Treble (1994) that includes not just
consumption goods and leisure but also absenteeism:
6u = u(x;l;￿) (1)
where u represent the individual￿ s utility, x is a vector of consumption goods, l is
leisure and ￿ an index representing the individual￿ s propensity to attend work or
not, which is assumed to be a random variable with probability density function
f(￿):2 This can be viewed as a work-absence continuum where at one extreme
an individual takes no absence and at the other extreme they are absent all the
time. The propensity to be absent will be determined by physical, environmental
and social factors, as suggested earlier. Workers tolerance of sickness and their
propensity to shirk varies. Therefore, we de￿ne some critical level ￿￿ where the
individual is indi⁄erent between attending or not. If ￿ > ￿￿ then the individual
will be absent and vice versa. We do not know if this is due to sickness or
shirking.
Standard assumptions made are that @u
@x > 0; @u
@l > 0 and @u
@￿ < 0: However,
it is also suggested that @u
2
@l@￿ > 0 and @u
2
@x@￿ < 0: These conditions assume that
all teachers ￿nd it more onerous to stay at work when there is an increase in
their propensity to take absence leave.
Now, assume a teacher is ill or feeling some level of stress. This is the
case where ￿ > ￿￿ and ￿ < ￿S, where ￿S denotes a level of illness/stress that
precludes attendance at work for the individual. We also assume the entitlement
to sick leave is not used up. There is a choice between attending or being absent.
2As there is no direct relationship between hours and pay for teachers, x might be extended
to include work as a consumption good where utility can be derived from e⁄ective delivery of
teaching according to the individual￿ s objectives and school￿ s requirements
7Some teachers, type A, may derive satisfaction from being able to maintain a
presence at work or see it is in their own best interest to carry out their duties.
This is the notion of presenteeism put forward by Chatterji and Tilley (2002).
If we assume that for a type A teacher the satisfaction from maintaining a
presence at work exactly o⁄sets illness or stress e⁄ects, then over this range of
￿, @u
2
@x@￿ = 0 and @u
2
@l@￿ < 0. An increase in sickness accompanied by an increase
in time at work leads to no change in utility. The teacher￿ s concern for her
class or the excess workload on colleagues, or perhaps their reputation with
the school management, counterbalances the decrease in utility from illness or
stress. Moreover, extra leisure time generates no increase in utility for this type
of individual, who can be characterised as a ￿ presenter￿ . For the other case,
type B (a shirker), the teacher will absent themselves as soon as ￿ > ￿￿ as the
previously assumed conditions hold. Hence, it may be realistic to characterise ￿
as an index signifying the propensity for an individual to absent him or herself,
which for a range between ￿￿ and ￿S may be only loosely related to mental or
physical wellbeing.
We cannot examine shirking e⁄ects between individuals within a school, but
we are able to model and test for shirking e⁄ects between schools and then
seek to quantify the amount of shirking. To do this we test for the impact of
being in a healthy or sick school (Imants and van Zoelen 1995) on individual
absenteeism. A sick school, one with high levels of voluntary absenteeism will
lead to teachers taking more days of absenteeism. This e⁄ect results from a
decrease in ￿￿ for individuals at the school, as norms and behaviour of peers
8in￿ uence individual decisions. Given that ￿S is ￿xed in the short term for each
individual, the gap between ￿￿ and ￿S increases and there is a larger potential
shirking gap.3 The reverse set of events would occur in healthy schools.
We model the absence probability function in general terms as
Yi = Y (Xi;Ci;Ss;Y H
s =Y S
s ;Ls;"i) (2)
where Yi denotes the absence days of teacher i; X is a vector of the teacher￿ s
personal characteristics; C is the type of contract the teacher is employed under,
S is a vector of the school￿ s (s) characteristics, Y H=Y S are variables that com-
pare the absence rate of the school to others in the sector, and as such denotes
our indicator of healthy, (Y H
s ), or sick, (Y S
s ), schools. This is the variable used
in seeking to distinguish shirking behaviour from involuntary absence. L is a
vector of characteristics relating to the school￿ s local labour market. Finally, "
is a stochastic error term.
The record of teacher absenteeism is a count of events over a period of time.
The class of models appropriate for analysing such events are count data models.
The most basic model that could be considered is a univariate Poisson model
where the underlying process determining absenteeism is represented as





3Clearly, ￿S would change for an individual over longer periods. Here our focus is on
short-term behaviour and we control for age di⁄erences between teachers within our sample
period.
9for ￿ > 0;y 2 f0;1;2::g, where the parameter ￿, the mean unobserved rate of
absence is assumed to be determined by some observed variables E(￿ijXi) =
exp(Xi￿). Poisson models are conditioned on the premise that the sample
variance is equal to the sample mean E(Y ) = V ar(Y ) = ￿. If this is not the case
and the variance exceeds the mean then the data are said to be overdispersed.
In this case the Poisson model will be ine¢ cient. Overdispersion in the Poisson
model is accounted for by unobserved heterogeneity between individuals, which
is overcome in the negative binomial model (NB) by adding a random error
term, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with the covariates in the model.
E(Yi) ￿ exp(xi￿ + ￿i) (4)
Assuming that ￿i is drawn from a gamma distribution where exp(￿i) ￿ ￿i, and
E(￿) = 1 and V ar(￿ )￿ ￿2 = 1
￿ then the following expression for the negative































The Poisson model is nested in the negative binomial model, as it is the
10case where ￿ = 0. Hence, a simple test to examine which model is more ap-
plicable is to test the hypothesis that the parameter determining the degree of
dispersion ￿ : Ho(￿ = 0). The negative binomial model can also be extended by
exploiting the panel element of the data in order to allow for individual random
e⁄ects (NB(RE)). This speci￿cation allows for randomness across individuals
and across time. As a result, the variance is captured across a two parameter
distribution, with parameters r and s distributed as Beta random variable (?).
The joint probability of the counts for the ith individual is given by:
Pr(Yi1;:::;YiTjXi1;:::;XiT =















Furthermore, the dependent variable, absenteeism, is dominated by a large
number of zeros and hence su⁄ers from partial observability. Some teachers
who do not take any days leave may never take absence leave. On the other
hand, some teachers may have characteristics associated with taking absence
but have failed to do so in the year in which we observe them. To allow for
the problem of partial observability, we estimate a zero-in￿ ated Poisson (ZIP)
model (Mullahey 1986, Lambert 1992, Bohara and Krieg 1996). For the ZIP
model the decision to take absence and the number of days of absence leave are
modelled jointly. First de￿ne A as a binary variable, where A = 1 is the decision
to take absence leave, and A = 0 otherwise. Thus, the density for the decision
11to be absent becomes:




where Zi are a vector of variables expected to a⁄ect the decision to be absent
and ￿ is a vector of parameters to be estimated and the conditional component
is a Poisson process. The density function for the decision not to be absent is:
Pr(Non ￿ absentee) = Pr(A = 0) + [1 ￿ P(A = 0)]:Pr(Y jA = 0) (10)
= [1 ￿ F(Zi￿)] + F(Zi￿):e￿￿i (11)
where the second term indicates the potential to become an absentee amongst










Whether the ZIP model is preferable to the standard negative binomial
model can be examined by using the non-nested test statistic proposed by
(Vuong 1989); values > 1:96 indicate the ZIP model is preferred and values
12< ￿1:96 suggest the standard negative binomial model is preferred.
For all models the number of days of absenteeism will be conditioned by
the amount of time that an individual is at risk of absence occurring. We can
control for this by including a term that captures exposure to absence. This
is captured for each teacher by the full-time equivalent ratio (FTE ratio), the
average amount of time per quarter that a teacher is employed expressed as a
percentage of full-time teaching load.
4 Data
Personnel records, including data on absenteeism, were obtained from Educa-
tion Queensland￿ s human resource information system on a quarterly basis for
2001(4) to 2002(3) for all teachers employed in the Queensland state school sys-
tem. Additionally, we have data for the last quarter of 2000. The absenteeism
data is recorded under two categories: family/paternity leave and absence due
to reasons of self-reported illness. The absence days are recorded as the cu-
mulative number of days per quarter. Our data tracks the individual teachers
through the four quarters, thereby enabling us to construct a panel data set of
teacher absenteeism. We focus on absence due to reported illness. Teachers can
take up to two weeks sick leave per year. They can accumulate unused sick leave
in a sick bank and there is no limit on how much leave can be accumulated,
but unlike some school districts in the US, there are no buy-back provisions for
unused sick leave.
13Queensland teachers can be employed under three types of contracts - casual,
permanent or temporary. Casual teachers are generally short-term contract
sta⁄, usually ￿ relief￿teachers, who may enter and leave the teaching workforce
on a regular basis. Consequently, we exclude this group from our analysis.
Temporary teachers are employed on ￿xed term contracts, typically covering
the school year, which can be renewed, whereas permanent teachers are in e⁄ect
tenured.
In common with previous studies, we restrict our analysis to teachers who
were employed throughout the year, to remove possible bias related to those
teachers in the process of leaving the profession. An upperbound limit was
applied to the cumulative total of absenteeism for an individual at 100 days
for the year, to exclude those long-term absentees who were most likely su⁄er-
ing an ongoing serious illness or frequently occurring bouts of illness (Barmby
and Stephan 2000).4 However, the data enables us to identify and control for
teachers who have a recognised disability, who would be expected to experience
higher levels of absenteeism.
For each teacher we have information on personal characteristics, such as
age, gender, tenure in the public sector and ethnicity; the latter is comprised
of three groups, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders (ATSI) (ie. indigenous
Australians), those from a Non-English Speaking Background (NESB) and other
Australians. We also have data on the workplace characteristics of teachers,
drawn from another source of school administrative data. From this we can de-
4We tested the robustness of our results to the removal of a limit on total days of
absenteeism.
14termine the school the teacher was working at, and also allows us to distinguish
between primary and secondary school teachers and the size of the school.
Measures of school quality are constructed from student record data that
refer to all students in the Queensland state school system in 2001. For primary
school students we have records for all year 7 students (the ￿nal year of primary
school) and matching year 5 records (for 1999). For secondary students we
have all year 10 student records (the ￿nal compulsory year of high school). The
student dataset also provides information on student test score performance.
In our data we have test scores for year 7 (with matching year 5 scores) and
standardized year 12 test scores. The individual pupil test scores are averaged
for each school to provide an indicator of school quality. However, for secondary
schools, year 12 test scores will not necessarily be an accurate representation
of overall student quality. This is because: (a) poorer quality or less motivated
students are likely to leave the school after the end of compulsory schooling
(year 10); and (b) some students may choose to move to more successful schools
to complete their high school. To allow for this our measure of secondary school
quality utilises school retention data, which refers to the proportion of students
who began at the school in year 7 that also completed at the same school in
year 12.
Queensland covers a large area of land and geographically remote areas
have higher concentrations of indigenous Australians who are, in socioeconomic
terms, generally amongst the most disadvantaged individuals (Bradley, Draca
and Green 2003). Other schools are in regional centres and then there is the
15urban concentration of population in south east Queensland centred around
Brisbane. As we have the postcode for each school, this enables us to identify
urban, rural and remote schools.
Importantly, our data can also be used to construct school level absenteeism
rates. Furthermore, as previously noted, we have access to school level data for
2000 (4), this allows us to observe absenteeism rates for the year prior to our
sample.
INSERT FIGURE 1
In Table 1a (Appendix), we present summary statistics on variables used in
the empirical analysis separately for primary and secondary schools. It is clear
that women dominate primary school teaching by a ratio of 5 to 1, whereas the
gender disparity is much lower in secondary school teaching. Other covariates
show little variation between primary and secondary schools. Three quarters of
all secondary school teachers are non-specialists, the omitted case.5 Figure 1
displays the distribution of individual absence days for the four quarters. The
majority of teachers took 0 or 1 days absence during this period, whilst there are
clear outliers at the right hand side of the distribution, which is characteristic
of a Poisson distribution.
INSERT TABLE 1
5The quali￿cations required to be a teacher in Australia di⁄er between primary and sec-
ondary school sectors. Secondary school teachers generally complete an undergraduate course
followed by a graduate diploma in education. Conversely, primary school teaching involves an
undergraduate course dedicated to primary school education. As a result subject specialization
and post-graduate study information is only available for secondary school teachers
16Table 1 shows summary statistics of teacher￿ s absence. The ￿gures are mean
values for the percentage of working time lost and percentage of teachers taking
absence. Figures for the UK from Bowers and McIver (2000) are presented for
comparison. It is interesting that the percentage of full-time teacher￿ s taking
absence and the percentage of time lost through absence is remarkably similar
for the UK and Australia. However, part-time teachers in the UK recorded a
higher proportion of working time lost through absence than full-time teachers,
whereas the opposite was true in Australia.
5 Results
The results for each variable are reported as raw coe¢ cients with standard errors
and, for ease of interpretation, the incident rate ratio (IRR) is also provided. The
latter provides some more direct comparison of the relative e⁄ects of covariates.
An IRR of greater than one indicates that the risk in the exposed group is
greater than the risk in the unexposed group. For instance an IRR of 1.15
indicates a 15% increase in risk for the exposed group, whilst 0.85 indicates a
15% decrease in risk. For both primary and secondary schools, the test statistic
for overdispersion con￿rms that NB is preferred to Poisson, which is consistent
with previous research (Delgado and Kniesner 1997). Hence, we take the NB
results (third column) as our base case but report the Poisson results (second
column) for comparison.
As there is a lack of detailed econometric evidence on teacher absenteeism,
17we discuss the impact of individual, school and local labour market character-





Table 2 shows that there are clear age e⁄ects whereby absenteeism levels
rise roughly monotonically with age. Older teachers (those over 50 years old)
take more absence whereas younger teachers (less than 40 years old) take less
absence. For example, according to the NB estimates a primary school teacher
aged 21-25 reduces the level of absenteeism by a factor of 11% relative to a
teacher aged 41-45 and a teacher aged 51-55 increases the level of absenteeism
by 23%. The relationship between age and absenteeism is less clear cut for
secondary school teachers (see Table 3), however, the e⁄ects for older workers
are much larger - a 30% and 66% increase in the risk for 51-55 and 56-65 year
olds, respectively. These ￿ndings could be partly to do with the e⁄ect of taking
accumulated leave before retirement (Ehrenberg et al 1986) as well as a general
decline in overall health. There is no clear gender di⁄erence in absenteeism rates
in primary schools, though this may re￿ ect the relatively small number of male
teachers in primary schools, whereas in secondary schools males have slightly
lower rates of absenteeism than females (see Table 3).
Primary indigenous teachers (ATSI) have approximately 28% and NESB 5%
18higher absenteeism rates than non-indigenous Australians. There is no signi￿-
cant e⁄ect for ATSI secondary school teachers but the risk for the NESB group
is increased to 9%. The high ￿gure for primary ATSI teachers may be related to
(a) family and extended family commitments and (b) poor health outcomes that
are not captured by the disability variable.6 Indigenous households are on av-
erage almost twice the size of other Australian households and frequently cater
for large numbers of transient visitors and relatives (Smith and Daly 2001). In
addition, there is evidence that a majority of indigenous families in remote com-
munities have childcare responsibilities extending beyond their own immediate
family (Smith and Daly 2001). Furthermore, there are more primary schools in
remote and rural locations and indigenous teachers are overrepresented in these
schools.
As expected, other than teachers aged 56-65, the biggest increase in the rate
of absenteeism (36% and 31%, respectively, for primary and secondary school
teachers) is associated with teachers who have a registered disability. Sta⁄ on
temporary contracts take signi￿cantly less days of absence than their colleagues
on permanent contracts, especially in secondary schools, which is consistent with
the ￿ndings of Ehrenberg et al (1986), and is indicative of possible presenteeism
e⁄ects. These sta⁄ could be under pressure to perform to secure a permanent
contract and so may operate with a temporarily lower ￿￿.
The ZIP speci￿cation provides estimates that are generally similar to those
6For instance, approximately 30% of indigenous people have long-term health problems
(Hunter 1999)
19obtained from the NB model 7 (The results for the in￿ ate equation are reported
in the Appendix Table 2.) The negative binomial model can be extended by
exploiting the panel element of the data in order to allow for individual random
e⁄ects (NB(RE)). This introduces an additional source of individual hetero-
geneity and these results are presented in the last column of Tables 2 and 3.
According to the log likelihood ratio tests, this speci￿cation is preferred to the
pooled NB and to the ZIP. In the panel model the relationship between age and
absenteeism for primary teachers is less systematic and the e⁄ects are weaker
for ￿ older￿workers, ATSI and disabled workers. For secondary school teachers
including a random e⁄ect has a more pronounced e⁄ect, insofar as all per-
sonal characteristics become insigni￿cant, except for disability and temporary
contract status. One implication of these ￿ndings is that allowing for unobserv-
ables, such as individual motivation, means that the relationship between age
and absenteeism may be spurious.
5.2 School level e⁄ects
There are school size and school quality e⁄ects. Larger schools are associated
with higher levels of absenteeism but at a diminishing rate as the squared term
is negative. Absenteeism is maximised at a pupil enrolment of 535 for primary
schools, for instance. Primary schools in which pupils achieve a higher literacy
test score have higher absenteeism levels, which although small is counterin-
7It is possible to modify the standard negative binomial model to estimate a zero-infalted
negative binomial (ZINB). We experimented with a number of variations of the in￿ate equation
and negative binomial count equation. All the covariates in the in￿ate equation were subject
to very large standard errors indicating that the model was not a good speci￿cation.
20tuitive. One possible interpretation of this is that better results have been
achieved through increased work and a side e⁄ect is increased stress and pres-
sure on teachers, hence resulting in higher absenteeism. For secondary school
teachers there are some indications that higher retention rates lead to less ab-
senteeism, but this e⁄ect is not signi￿cant in the ZIP or NB(RE) models. For
secondary school teachers we are able to identify their teaching specialism. The
NB model suggests that science teachers take less absence (13%), but is only
marginally signi￿cant in the random e⁄ects model.
5.3 Location & labour market e⁄ects
We ￿nd that teachers in remote and rural schools take less absence than teachers
in urban schools. This could be related to a greater commitment amongst
teachers willing to take teaching posts in these areas and a greater sense of
community involvement. It might also re￿ ect the greater di¢ culty of covering
teacher absence in non-urban areas as the availability of casual supply teachers
is more limited. In fact, the proportion of casual teachers is lower in remote
areas, 50% less than in urban areas in the case of primary schools and 20% less
for secondary schools.
Teachers in schools in an area with a higher unemployment rate have higher
levels of absenteeism, however, these e⁄ects are small. One possibility is that
higher unemployment rates mean fewer alternative local job opportunities, so
more time may be required for job search activities both within and outside
teaching. Alternatively, it could re￿ ect a sorting mechanism whereby lower
21quality teachers gravitate to areas with higher unemployment.
5.4 Sick Schools, Healthy Schools and Shirking
In section 3 we demonstrated how school level absenteeism is likely to a⁄ect in-
dividual shirking or presenter behaviour. We now adopt an empirical procedure
to examine these e⁄ects. The measure is based on a comparison of expected and
actual absenteeism rates in each school. School absence rates will be in￿ uenced
by observable characterisitics of the school such as, its location, the average age
of its sta⁄, the proportion with a disability, the proportion on temporary con-
tracts and whether the school is a primary school. The in￿ uence of unobserved
factors will make the actual school absence rate either higher or lower than the
expected rate based on observable characteristics. The di⁄erence between the
expected and observed absence rates provides an indicator of schools where the
propensity of teachers to absent on average is higher than can be explained
by observable characteristics. The converse is true where school absence rates
are lower than expected. We use this di⁄erence as a signal of sick and healthy
schools.
INSERT TABLE 4
We include in our preferred model (NB(RE)) variables to capture shirking
and presenteeism e⁄ects. However, a school could be sick or healthy in a given
quarter due to transitory unobserved factors, and so to overcome this we esti-
mate school level regressions using data for the preceeding year (2000(4)) along
with 2001 (4). Data for the previous year allows us to (a) overcome potential
22endogeneity problems and (b) identify persistently sick and healthy schools.8
These school level models are used to predict the absenteesim level for each
school (c Ys). The predicted level of absenteeism is deducted from the actual
level of absenteesim for the relevant quarter (Ys ￿ b Ys). The resulting distribu-
tion of di⁄erences between predicted and actual absenteeism rates was used to
identify ￿ sick￿and ￿ healthy￿schools, that is, those schools in the top 25% of the
distribution (Ys > b Ys) for quarter 2000(4) and quarter 2001(4) were classi￿ed
as sick schools (Y S
s ) whereas those in the bottom 25% of the distribution are
classi￿ed as healthy schools (Y H
s ):Table 4 presents summary data on the schools
identi￿ed as sick, healthy and intermediate (those within the 25% to 75% range
of the distribution). Sick school￿ s absence rates are just over twice the level of
those in intermediate schools, whilst healthy schools have absence rates of just
over a third of intermediate school rates. It is noticeable that the observed char-
acteristics of the sick and healthy schools are broadly similar. The exception is
rural schools that are over represented in healthy schools.
The indicators of sick schools and healthy schools are included in the pre-
ferred (NB(RE)) model to capture shirking and presenteeism e⁄ects and are
reported in Table 5. For both primary and secondary schools the coe¢ cient on
Y S
s is positive and signi￿cant and Y H
s is negative and signi￿cant; although the
healthy school e⁄ect is only marginally signi￿cant for secondary schools. The
estimates suggest that the absenteeism rate of a teacher will be 37% higher in a
sick primary school compared to a healthy school, the corresponding ￿gure for
8The results for the quarter four 2001 regression are reported in the Appendix, Table 3,
for illustration. A similar set of results were obtained for the regression for 2000(4).
23secondary schools is 24% 9.
Another way we can illustrate the impact on an individual teacher of a sick or
healthy school environment is to examine how the absence rate changes of those
teachers who move from one type of school (e.g. healthy) to the other type of
school (e.g. sick) during the 2001 calendar year. The absence rate data for sick
and healthy schools and teachers who move between them is presented in Table
6. These rates are calculated based on ￿gures for 2000(4) and 2001(4). Firstly,
we note that sick school average absenteeism rates for quarter 4 2001, shown in
columns two and three, are over twice as large as those of healthy schools. The
movers data is presented in columns four and ￿ve. For those who move from
sick to healthy schools, the average days absenteeism per quarter declined from
1.79 to 1.00. For those moving in the other direction average days absenteeism
increased from 0.80 to 1.78. Note that for teachers who made a transition
between schools of the same type (sick to sick or healthy to healthy), there
was little change in absenteeism rates. For teachers in general, absenteeism had
declined from 1.52 to 1.32 over the same period, a 13% reduction. Thus, even
allowing for a possible trend decline in absenteeism, a teacher who moves from
a sick to a healthy school experiences a 30% reduction in absenteeism; a healthy
to sick school move is associated with an increase in absenteeism of over 100%.
These changes cannot be fully attributed to shirking e⁄ects in sick schools or
presenteeism e⁄ects in healthy schools, however, the factors a⁄ecting involuntary
9The estimates were robust to a reclassi￿cation of sick and healthy schools to the top and
bottom deciles and if we selected sick and healthy schools only on the distribution of Ys at
quarter 2001(4).
24absence are unlikely to have changed signifcantly over this period. Therefore, it
is more likely that the change in absenteeism is due to an increase/decrease in
voluntary absence as a response to a change in the school environment.
To examine whether the changes in mover absenteeism rates are statistically
signi￿cant, we estimated a negative binomial model for 2001(4) with dummy
variables to indicate movements between sick and healthy schools. The estimate
for sick to healthy movers was a 53% reduction in recorded absenteeism for
primary school teachers and 30% reduction for secondary school teachers (both
signi￿cant at the 1% level). The corresponding estimate for healthy to sick
movers was a 70% increase in recorded absenteeism for primary school teachers
and a 33% increase for secondary school teachers (both signi￿cant at the 1%
level).10
6 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model where teacher absence behaviour is partly
dependent on the school environment in which they work. To do this we use a
unique database of all primary and secondary teachers employed in the Queens-
land public sector in the period 2001-2002, and estimate a variety of econometric
models that allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity and the partial ob-
servability of the response variable. The results of our analysis suggest that
absenteeism is an outcome of individual and school-level factors, although some
10A similar set of covariates were included as in Tables 2 and 3. The estimates did not
change signifcantly through the inclusion of the mover variables. For the sake of brevity these
estimates are not reported.
25of these e⁄ects disappear when unobserved heterogeneity and partial observ-
ability are allowed for. However, our principal ￿nding is that teachers in schools
with a history of high absenteeism take between 24% and 38% more recorded
days of absence than teachers in schools which have a history of low absenteeism.
Furthermore, teachers who move between sick and healthy schools exhibit signif-
icant changes in absenteeism behaviour, which is highly likely to be a result of a
change in voluntary absence rates. Together these results provide empirical sup-
port for our model, where the propensity to shirk (and present) is conditioned
by the organisational environment.
The quantitative importance of these shirking and presenteeism e⁄ects would
suggest an important role for management-sta⁄ relations in determining ab-
sence. Just as explicit di⁄erences in organisation￿ s policy and environment
can a⁄ect the level of absenteeism (Ehrenberg et al 1986), management and
personnel factors will also be in￿ uential. Thus, a bottom-up approach would
appear to be an essential part of any absence management policy (Allegro and
Veerman 1998). Our results also support continued attempts to build a more
extensive model of absenteeism, where absence is seen as the interaction of in-
dividual and organisational needs and objectives.
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31Table 1: Summary Teacher Absence Data Australia and UK
Australia 2002 UK 1999
Primary Secondary
Percentage time lost - All 2.96 3.02 3.15
Percentage time lost - F/T 2.69 2.66 3.28
Percentage time lost - P/T 2.26 2.46 3.68
Percentage taking absence - F/T 68.4 65.19







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 4: Sick School-Healthy School Characteristics Q4:2001
Sick Schools Healthy Schools Intermediate Schools
Proportion Male 0.24 0.17 0.21
Proportion Disabled 0.06 0.10 0.05
Proportion Temporary 0.08 0.09 0.09
Average Age 40.93 41.72 40.21
Remote 0.15 0.13 0.15
Rural 0.24 0.45 0.29
Absence Rates (S.D) 2.91 (1.08) 0.51 (0.49) 1.42 (1.19)
13[ ] are the standard errors. *,**,*** refer to 1%, 5% and 10% signi￿cance re-
spectively. The omitted case is a 41-45 yr old non-indigenous female teacher from an
English language background who is working in an urban school and has a general
education quali￿cation.
35Table 5: Sick School-Healthy School Model13
Primary NB(RE) Secondary NB(RE)
Coe⁄ IRR Coe⁄ IRR
Y Ss 0.141* [0.45] 1.151 0.061*** [0.036] 1.063
Y Hs -0.271* [0.022] 0.762 -0.153 *[-0.043] 0.858
21-25 0.031 [0.038] 1.032 0.064 [0.056] 1.067
26-30 -0.071** [0.028] 0.931 -0.052 [0.039] 0.949
31-35 -0.121* [0.026] 0.886 0.005 [0.037] 1.006
36-40 -0.057** [0.027] 0.944 0.004 [0.037] 1.004
46-50 0.000 [0.025] 1.000 -0.006 [0.035] 0.994
51-55 0.107* [0.027] 1.112 0.080** [0.037] 1.085
56-65 0.112* [0.033] 1.118 0.046 [0.044] 1.048
Male -0.005 [-0.018] 0.995 -0.037*** [0.021] 0.963
ATSI 0.182**[0.074] 1.120 0.044 [0.113] 1.045
NESB 0.038 [0.030] 1.039 0.048 [0.037] 1.050
Disability 0.182* [0.031] 1.200 0.163* [0.040] 1.177
Temporary 0.041 [0.032] 1.042 -0.049 [0.052] 0.953
Enrolment 0.001* [0.0001] 1.001 0.0003* [0.0001] 1.0002
Enrolment2 -5.0e-07* [0.000] 0.999 -8.0e-08** [0.000] 0.999
Literacy_yr7/Retention rate 0.001* [0.0002] 1.001 -0.0001 [0.0001] 0.999
Science -0.047 [0.031] 0.955
Engineering 0.066 [0.061] 1.069
Humanities 0.051*** [0.029] 1.053
Remote -0.266* [0.030] 0.766 -0.127* [-0.045] 0.881
Rural -0.110* [0.020] 0.899 -0.164* [0.029] 0.849
Unemployment Rate 0.007* [0.001] 1.001 0.006** [0.025]
No of Obs 50,062 30,260
Log lkhd -75,883 -44,893
LR Test 0.00 0.00
Pseudo r2 0.22 0.26
r 6.243*[0.131] 5.121*[0.131]
s 2.613*[0.062 2.147*[0.062]
36Table 6: Absence Rates for School Movers
Absence Rates Movers
Primary Secondary To Sick To Healthy
Sick 1.76 1.50 1.90/1.66 1.79/1.00
Healthy 0.77 0.74 0.80/1.78 0.72/0.80
37A Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Primary and Secondary Schools
Primary Secondary
Mean S.D Mean S.D.
Absenteeism 1.49 4.28 1.45 4.56
21-25 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19
26-30 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33
31-35 0.17 0.37 0.15 0.36
36-40 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36
46-50 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37
51-55 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35
56-65 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26
Male 0.18 0.38 0.40 0.49
Remote 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.24
Rural 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.37
Unemployment Rate (%) 8.6 4.1 8.6 4.3
ATSI 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09
NESB 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27
Disability 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Temporary 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20
Enrolment 492 256 958 495













39Table 3: School Absenteeism 2002 Q1 - OLS Estimates
Proportion male 0.275 (0.64)
Proportion disabled 3.310 (1.67)
Proportion temporary -1.131 (2.32)
Average age 0.042 (3.30)
Remote -0.420 (3.48)
Rural -0.265 (2.14)
Primary 0.159 (1.53)
Obs 1,147
R2 0.08
40